課程名稱：西洋哲學史(三)：從理性論到經驗論 課程性質：必修 課程範圍：Locke、Berkeley、Hume 開課教師：羅麗君 開課學院：文學院 開課系級：哲學三 考試日期(年月日)：100年1月13日 考試時限(Mins)：3小時 試題本文： 1.請分別說明經驗主義三大哲學家Locke、Berkeley和Hume各自提出的「經驗論原則」， 並簡單分析它們之間的異同之處。(25分) 2.請先解釋Locke有關"substance"概念的分析。再以下段文字為指引而去說明Berkeley 對其之批判。(25分) Hyl:Isn't it sufficiently expressed in the term 'substratum' or 'substance'? Phil:If so, the word 'substratum' should mean that is is spread under the sensible qualities. Hly:And consequently ‧spread‧ under extendedness. Hyl:I agree. Phil:So in its own nature it is entirely distinctfrom extendedness.Hyl: I tell you, extendedness is only a quality, and matter is something that supports qualities. And isn't it obvious that the supported thing is different from the supporting one? Phil:So something distinct from extendedness, and not including it, is supposed to be the substratum of extendedness. Hyl:Just so. Phil: Tell me, Hylas, can a thing be spread without being extended? Isn't the idea of extendedness necessarily included in ‧that of‧spreading? Hyl: It is. Phil: So anything that you suppose to be spread under something else must have in itself an extendedness distinct from the extendedness of the thing under which it is spread. Hyl: It must. Phil: Consequently every bodily substance, being the substratum of extendedness, must have in itself another extendedness which qualifies it to be a substratum,‧and that extendedness must also have something spread under it, a sub-substratum, so to speak‧, and so on to infinity. Isn't this absurd in itself, as well as conflicting with that you have just said, namely that the substratum was something distinct from extendedness and not including it? (from Berkeley's Dialques, p.659.) 3.Hume如何以「觀念連結」的原則去批判物質實體(material substance)的存在和自我的 人格同一性(personal identity)問題？(25分) 4.請根據以下文字詳細說明Hume針對「因」「果」概念與關係的分析。(25分) "When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effecto to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actuall, in fact, follow the other. The impluse of one billiard-ball is attended whit motion in the econd. This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects: Consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion."(from Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p.655.) --

※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 59.121.36.14