http://tinyurl.com/2cgosb2 What China's Stealth Fighter Means Jan 10, 2011 By David Fulghum, Bill Sweetman, Robert Wall Washington, Washington, London With the surprise rollout and high-speed taxi tests of China’s newest J-20 fighter, a stealth prototype, the U.S. Navy’s top intelligence official admits that the Pentagon has erred in its estimates of the speed with which Beijing is introducing new military technology. (惊讶於J20的推出和试跑，美国海军官员承认对於中国推出新武器 的速度估计错误) The aircraft’s existence was not a surprise to the intelligence community, but “one of the things that is . . . true is that we have been pretty consistent in underestimating the delivery and initial operational capability of Chinese technology weapons systems,” says Vice Admiral David J. Dorsett, deputy chief of naval operations for information dominance and director of naval intelligence. Two recent examples of misanalyses have been the J-20 fighter and the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (AW&ST Jan. 3, p. 18). Moreover, there is evidence that China’s advances include high-performance engines and missiles that display a new level of technical maturity and performance. (一位美国海军主管情报及资讯管制的中将说，他们并不惊讶於此机 的存在，但他们一直低估了中国推出以及投入新武器服役的速度。 近期两个例子为J20和DF21D。另外，中国在高性能引擎及飞弹 上的进步也显示了技术成熟度和能力上了个新台阶) “In terms of the [J-20] stealth photos, it’s not clear to me when it’s going to become operational,” Dorsett says. “Do we need to refine our assessments better? I think so.” Other Washington-based intelligence officials say they are watching the J-20’s testing with interest. “They have done several high-speed taxis with the nosewheel off the ground,” says another veteran analyst. “They could still be working out some kinks before they try an actual first flight.” (老美认为他们要改进他们的情报能力。他们不清楚J20何时才能真 正服役，但从中国仍在试跑J20的情况来看，中国很可能仍在进行 第一次试飞前的调整。) There also are a lot of unknowns about the aircraft’s real importance. “Operational impact is a tough call to make at this point, given that this plane, even if it flies, is not going to be a full-up fifth-gen [aircraft],” the analyst says. “In essence, this is going to be a novelty for the next decade before it starts to roll off the series production lines and gets to the line units in any numbers that would impact any of our mission planning. A lot of things can happen, good and bad, between now and then to either speed this up or severely put the brakes on things. (J20能造成的影响目前仍无法清楚得知。就算它能飞，它仍不算一 架完全的第五代战机。它还很新，现在到未来进入生产线前，一大 堆事都可能发生。) “As far as radar cross section goes, this is not [a Lockheed Martin] F-22, nor should we be thinking that they are going for low RCS right out of the chute,” he says. “We have to keep in mind that this is the first attempt and it’s also the very first prototype of that first attempt. There’s a lot of tweaking . . . before they get to the final version. I see too many people . . . making sweeping assessments. That has always been a mistake.” (就RCS而言，它不像F22，一开始不会有低RCS。它是中国第一 次的匿踪战机嚐试，很多部分都要调整。在最後的构型出现前，太 早进行评估永远是个错误。) Engines have been an Achilles’ heel for Chinese high-performance aircraft. The Chinese have not produced an indigenous engine that has the performance they need for a world-class fighter. Under earlier military doctrine, which favored mass over advanced technology, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force was equipped with adapted versions of 1950s-era Soviet aircraft designs using old-technology engines. Analysts offer different assessments of China’s first high-performance engine, the Shenyang WS-10; but recent images of the J-11B fighter—China’s bootleg version of the Sukhoi Su-30—appear to show a nozzle design that differs visibly from the Russian AL-31F and resembles that of WS-10 engines displayed at air shows. (中国的引擎科技一直是其软肋。但近来在J11B上出现的WS10 引擎显示了中国在这方面的进步。) Dorsett downplays the immediate impact of the new fighter and new anti-ship missile. “I’m more worried about Chinese game-changing capabilities in nonkinetic [areas such as information dominance, network invasion and electronic warfare],” he says. “I am most concerned about China’s focus on trying to develop [the ability] to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum, to counter space capabilities and to conduct cyberactivities. （该名美国海军中将认为中国在电磁、太空和网络方面的威胁比 J20和DF21D所能带来的要大） “The other concern I have is China’s ability to become operationally efficient in a sophisticated, complex, joint war-fighting environment,” Dorsett says. “I don’t see China with those capabilities now. I do see them delivering individual components and weapon systems [such as the J-20 and DF-21D], but until they acquire proficiency [with them], how competent are they really going to be?” The Chinese military’s self-proclaimed timeline is mid-century, Dorsett notes. In that context, he denies that the Pentagon is overestimating its threat. “I’m not alarmed,” Dorsett says. “I am intrigued by developments and am quite interested in the quantities and different types of technologies that we didn’t expect or overestimated.” (该将领很老神在在。他表示他对於中国在复杂条件下的联战能力 比较关注。中国目前仍缺乏这些方面的熟练度，而中国自己宣称的 时间表是本世纪中才会实现。) There is a marked relationship between China’s booming economy and its military buildup, he points out. But there are equally obvious shortfalls. “The Chinese don’t have a great integrated ISR capability or an anti-submarine capability at all,” Dorsett says. “They don’t demonstrate a sophisticated level in joint warfighting. They are at the early stages of operational proficiency across the board. What would be dangerous is underestimating the timeline of synchronizing these various elements.” (中国目前的反潜、ISR整合和联战能力都还在未成熟的早期阶 段。但低估其发展整合的速度是危险的。) Dorsett returned to the unexpected appearance of the J-20. “How far along are they?” he asks. “I don’t know. They clearly have an initial prototype. Is it advanced and how many trials, tests and demos do they have to go through before it becomes operational? That’s not clear to me.” However, the evidence of the design’s sophistication is mounting. The J-20 is supposed to carry new weaponry with some of it tucked away internally. China is continuing an effort to expand the military’s air-to-air missile inventory. Although Avic officials have not discussed what comes after the PL-12A radar-guided medium-range missile, new information suggests that work is progressing on several enhanced versions. These include a combined solid-motor, ramjet-powered PL-21. The missile, with a single inlet for the ramjet, may have undergone ground tests last year. (该老美中将称不知J20实际发展到什麽进度。但一些迹象显示其 先进的程度，如中航发展中的数个PL12A後继型飞弹，如冲压引 擎的PL21。) Work may be slightly more advanced on the PL-12D, a ramjet upgrade of the basic PL-12 with more modest changes to the airframe and less endgame maneuverability than the PL-21 would feature. Chinese industry also appears to be working on the PL-12C with smaller aft control fins for internal carriage on the J-20. The mid-body fins are believed to be similar to the basic PL-12 and PL-12B with improved electronic counter-countermeasures. (另外，还有一个较PL21不先进的冲压引擎版本，PL12D，也在 发展中。PL12C，有着较小气动控制面使其得以被收纳入J20内 置武器舱内的固燃火箭版本，也在发展中。) The close-in battle would use the PL-10, whose design may resemble South Africa’s Denel A-Darter. China’s ability to increasingly use standoff weapons, also in air-to-ground and anti-ship missile roles, is already affecting planning among potential adversaries. Japanese military officials are showing interest in missiles with greater ranges to be able to engage Chinese threats earlier, and there are discussions in the U.S. about the need for weapons with greater engagement capability. (近战用的PL10近似A-Darter。中国进展中使用空对空／地的能 力已影响多个潜在对手，包括美国和日本的国防计划) Dorsett also expanded on earlier remarks about the DF-21D missile by U.S. Navy officials. “[U.S. Pacific Command’s] assessment is that it has reached an initial operational capability,” he says. “They’ve tested it over land sufficient times that the missile system itself is competent and capable. Could they start to employ that in a fielded, operational [environment]? I think so. [However,] there is a question of fusing all the information they need for targeting. There are still some [unknowns] about how proficient they would need to be to fully deploy it at this point.” Meanwhile, the Navy has changed its assessment of the DF-21’s ability to threaten a ship. Until now, the service has essentially rated as “poor” the possibility of China’s hitting an aircraft carrier with a ballistic missile. (中国已多次在陆上测试DF21D。美国太平洋司令部的评估是其已 达到初始作战能力的地步。但对於中国有多少能力融合标定目标所 需的资讯仍不清楚。到目前为止，美国海军仍估计中国用BM击中 航舰的机率为不佳。) “The technology that the Chinese have developed and are employing in the DF-21 system has increased their probability of hitting a maneuvering target with a salvo of several missiles,” Dorsett says. “What that probability is, we don’t know. I’m assessing that they don’t know. To our knowledge they haven’t test-fired this over water against a maneuvering target.” （中国在发展中的科技已增加在齐射条件下BM击中航舰的机率。 但机率为何？老美不知道，可能中国自己也不知道。中国目前未有 对海上机动目标试射该飞弹的纪录） That leaves Dorsett with the problem of improving intelligence-gathering to make the Pentagon’s predictions more reliable. “One area we haven’t made much progress on was processing, exploiting and disseminating [data],” he says. “It’s high on our list for the upcoming year. We’re tackling imagery exploitation first. I think an awful lot can be automated. You don’t need to look at every piece of electro-optical imagery. You need tools that alert you to key issues.” （该将领声称自动化反PS／伪装的科技将是改善情报作业的重 点。） --

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