http://tinyurl.com/4bm4zu7 J-20 - The Dragon Gets Airborne Posted by Bill Sweetman at 1/11/2011 7:27 AM CST A lot of people have weighed in so far on what the appearance of the J-20 prototype (or prototypes, as some pictures suggest) means for Chinese and US strategy. （很多人在讨论J20原型机对中美战略的影响） What's fascinating is that, faced with the same kind of information gap that we dealt with in the Cold War, the debate has fallen into the same mold, pitting the hawks against the skeptics. This time around, however, a lot of the people arguing that the J-20 is a propaganda exercise, a preliminary prototype at best, are on the inside of the Pentagon. （令人讶异的是我们面临了和冷战时期一样的资讯鸿沟：讨论 陷入了鹰派和怀疑论者的论战。但这一次，很多怀疑论者是在 五角大厦这一边：他们怀疑J20只是宣传的幌子） If you wanted to be really, really cynical about this, you would note that a certain white-haired gentleman in the Pentagon is on record as saying that China won't have an operational stealth aircraft before 2020, and that public disagreement with said gentleman has (on occasion) turned out to be sub-optimal from a career-development standpoint. （如果你很机车的话，盖兹可以算上一个这样的。他说2020年前中国 不会有投入服役的的匿踪机。这对他的官运有伤啊！） However, belief that the J-20 is a long way off is also based on comparison with recent US program performance - and although this may produce the right answer, it will do so for the wrong reasons. （但是，认为中国在这方面还有很长的路要走的想法，虽然不 一定是错的，却可能是基於错误的理由：拿美国近来相关计画 的时间来推论中国也要那麽多时间。） When it comes to timing, the right answer for now starts with admitting that we don't know the answer. We have no good track record for the pace of development in China because it is not that long since China's economy started to take off, and not that long since the Maoist doctrine of the PLA - favoring numbers and politics over technology - gave way to a major program of modernization. One generation of Chinese development - represented by the J-10/10B, JF-17 and J-11B doth not a trend make. （要知道正确的答案，我们得先承认我们不知道答案。中 国经济才起飞没多少年，整个制度现代化的历程没有多 入。一世代的发展很难让人对趋势做出结论。） The key pointers to the timing at this point are mostly out of sight from the West, because they are items that can be simulated or tested on the ground. They include progress with active electronically scanned array radar, passive electronic surveillance systems and (as often mentioned) propulsion. Blog photos do not tell us very much about that kind of hardware. （网上的照片很难告诉我们实际的情况，尤其是关於AESA或 电子侦查或推进系统之类可以在地面实验或模拟的科技） Still less do they say much about the other essential element of a stealth aircraft, the complex sensor fusion and threat avoidance software that allows it to track targets with minimal transmissions while flying a precise path around planned and pop-up threats. （同样难以知道的还包括资料融合以及能同时进行电磁讯号管 理和精确飞行计画的任务管理软体） It is probably a safe assessment that the J-20 is the first Chinese stealth aircraft (unless it has been preceded by another, covert demonstrator), so it will be a learning tool as well as a prototype in its own right. Almost regardless of the date at which it first enters service, its capabilities will evolve as the threat does. （可以很安全地说，J20是中国首种匿踪机（除非还有别的外 面不知道的实验机存在），它会是个原型机和了解相关科技的平 台。无论它何时投入服役，最後它的威胁会和它的能力一同增 加） And do not forget the other X-factor: China's unprecedented access to foreign technical data via cyberespionage, data that can be widely disseminated without putting the intelligence system itself at risk. （更不用提中国还有一项利器：中国的网路窃秘行动） As for the aircraft itself: start with the size. Capability has been favored over low unit cost. And even with the in-development 33,000-pound-thrust WS-15 it may have a lower thrust-to-weight ratio than many of its contemporaries. Relative to Typhoon or Rafale, the wing appears more highly loaded and more sharply swept, favoring speed rather than ultimate agility. （关於这飞机，先从它的尺寸谈起。即使用上了发展中的， 33000磅(?)推力的WS15，推重比仍相对於台风和飙风不足。 其翼型显示高翼负荷，较有利於速度而非敏捷性） In LO terms, if this is truly a case of WYSIWYG, we are looking at a modified version of the F-22/F-35 "bowtie" signature pattern - actually a sort of Wild Bill Hickock "string tie" with the dangling strings being the rear sector. （关於低可视度，如果真的看到什麽就是什麽，那麽它的讯号 图谱是一个类似於F22/35的「蝴蝶结」形──事实上是拖着 一堆尾巴的蝴蝶结形） What is interesting about this is the ATF history, where the stealth requirement started along those lines. But Lockheed and Northrop promised the full bowtie with very low rear signatures, with no performance or cost penalty, and the requirement was changed. Whether that was really a smart idea, I don't know. （在ATF发展的历史中，类似的设计也出现过。但LM和诺斯 若普提出完全的、不需成本或性能牺牲的蝴蝶结设计，最後设 计需求也提高至该水平。J20的设计是不是一个聪明的决定 呢？我不知道。） What this suggests is that the Chinese expect to use this aircraft in circumstances where it can disengage, turn and run - maintaining engagement control, in short. （这样的设计暗示了J20设计的作战环境是可以脱离战斗并转 身离开的情况） This isn't surprising. While the J-20's proportions may be reminiscent of the F-111, it is unlikely to have the same mission (penetrating strike). The PLA, from the antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) through air-launched cruise missiles on the 1950s-technology H-6 bomber to its Type 022 missile boats, seems happy to leave the last run to the target to the missile. Also, for the time being, the PLA is not looking at having to fight through an integrated air defense system and fight its way out again. （这并不让人意外。J20的尺寸或许像F111，但它不太可能被 拿来执行同样的穿透打击任务。众多的历史经验显示PLA不介 意让飞弹来跑最後一程。并且，目前PLA并没有要穿透IADS 再杀出血路来的需求） What the J-20 should do best is go fast, at high altitude, over a decent range - which leads to my guess is that this aircraft is primarily air-to-air, designed to cause the US really big problems with non-survivable air assets – tankers and ISR. Defending them against a rapidly developing attack by aircraft with a reduced frontal RCS would not be easy. （J20应该最适合高空大速长程的作战任务。我猜测其主要为 攻击加油机或电战／预警机的空对空任务。要防卫这样的攻击 很困难） Range, relative positioning and initiative are the key. With a long unrefueled range and useful sustained supersonic flight (just how good it will be depends on engine data we don't have), the J-20 could hold high-value air assets too far from China to be of much use. It doesn't have to be able to mix it one-for-one with the F-22: there are not enough F-22s to defend everything at Pacific distances. （航程、相对位置及计划为这样任务的作战关键。以其长航程 和超巡能力，J20可以迫使高价值空中目标远离中国而无法发 挥作用。中国甚至不需要太多这样的飞机，因为并没有足够的 F22来保卫整个太平洋战区。） The long-range P-38 Lightning could not close-combat a Zero, but then it didn't have to - and its pilots also learned very quickly that its level and climb speed advantage permitted them to control the engagement. （这就像P38对抗零式的策略：P38没办法和零式近战，但它 可以用它的速度和爬升率优势来控制交战的时机。） Another longer-term possibility for the J-20 is a "baby Backfire" to threaten Aegis ships, another vital and limited asset, with an air launched, supersonic sea-skimmer missile - and you don't have to sink them, just use dispersed kinetic weapons or an EMP warhead to put the antennas out of service. （另一个较长期才会实现的可能性是把J20当迷你逆火来对抗 神盾舰。它可以发射超音速掠海反舰飞弹，而且用不着非要击 沉神盾舰──用散布的动能或EMP弹头来瘫痪其雷达天线就 行。） Both these missions fit with the anti-access/area denial (A2AD) theme that runs through a lot of PLA planning, including medium-range missile development. US freedom of operation inside the "second island chain" around China - running from Japan south to Guam and West Papua and encompassing the Philippine and China seas - depends on bases such as Andersen in Guam and Kadena in Japan, on tankers, airborne ISR and on carrier air power, and those assets increasingly support one another. （这两种任务都符合解放军一贯的反进入／区域拒止战略。美 国的军事行动自由依赖第二岛链上的基地、加油机、电战／预 警机和航舰兵力。它们彼此愈来愈相互依赖。 That's where an operational J-20 - whenever it appears – will generate options for the PLA and problems for its adversaries, and that is the figure of merit for any deterrent system. （这是当J20投入服役，无论何时，PLA所会增加的作战选择 和它的对手所要面对的问题。这无疑地造成了威慑。） --

※ 发信站: 批踢踢实业坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 96.238.154.155