为什麽他兵推，解放军永远无法登陆桃园？ 最後跑去嘉义吃蚵？ 看一下原文 https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/08/25/china_cannot_yet_hold_a_ beach_on_taiwan_1202270.html https://reurl.cc/RRedQ6 We ran three simulations of the 3rd Marine BDE landing on the shores near Taoyuan Airport, the site used in Max Stewart’s scenario. In the first simulation, which is a baseline case, we assume the Taiwanese have been alerted at least two hours before Chinese debarkation and have deployed what we calculated is the minimum winning defending force that could successfully survive and hold the 3rd Marine BDE on the beach. This combined-arms force comprises one reserve infantry, one Marine armor, and one artillery battalion, without any reinforcements. At 0600 the PLANMC hit the beach with only their recon and four maneuver BNs, fail in their attempts to push off the beach until 1000, and then collapse into a defense and initiate a failed evacuation that results in a surrender. Ten percent of landing craft are destroyed in the landing, and another 25 percent are lost during the beach withdrawal, typical for all of the cases below, highlighting the high attrition of an opposed landing against even a minimal defense. In the second simulation, all ROCA units advance from garrison only at the moment of the PLANMC’s offshore debarkation, so only four reserve infantry and two artillery BNs are initially defending the beach. Within an hour, two artillery BNs and three brigades of mechanized infantry come in as reinforcements, followed by Marine and Army armor. This is its detailed explanation. In this more realistic and severe outcome, the PLANMC is abruptly blocked at the beach and counter-attacked and fails in an attempted evacuation to the sea, resulting in a PLANMC surrender. In a third simulation, we posited landing three PLANMC Marine Brigades (3rd, 4th and 5th BDEs), to examine whether China could overwhelm beach defenses with mass (despite China not having sufficient amphibious lift capability to drop a PLANMC division-equivalent 21nm off the Taiwanese coast). We assume that this scale of naval movement permits sufficient time for the ROCA to deploy to the coast (6 hours), reinforced by units as far away as 40 km, for a force total of four mechanized infantry, one Marine, two armored and two artillery brigades. The concentration of China’s scarce amphibious forces permitted the freeing up of Taiwanese reserves, countering the mass of the attack. For one hour the PLAN tried unsuccessfully to push off the beach, shifted to a defense, and initiated a failed evacuation in the fourth hour. While evacuations are more politically acceptable to Beijing than surrender, ad hoc efforts tend to escalate casualties. 第一种模拟（基准线想定）： 作为基准案例，我们假定台湾守军在共军离舰泛水前至少两小时获得预警， 并部署了我们计算出能够存活并在滩头将共军陆战第3旅成功封堵的「最低胜利防卫兵力」 这支联合兵种防卫兵力包含： 一个後备步兵营、一个陆战队装甲营，以及一个炮兵营，且没有任何後续增援。 在 0600 时，解放军海军陆战队仅以其侦察营与四个机动营（联兵营）抢滩， 直到 1000 时都无法将滩头阵地向内陆推进，随後战线崩溃转为防御态势。 共军发起撤退行动但遭到失败，最终导致投降。 在此次登陆过程中，10% 的登陆艇遭到摧毁，在撤离滩头时又损失了 25%， 这种耗损率在以下所有想定中皆属常态，凸显了即使面对最低限度的防御， 强行登陆（opposed landing）仍会产生极高的战损。 第二种模拟（更写实的想定）： 在此模拟中，所有中华民国陆军（ROCA）部队直到解放军舰队在近海开始卸载 （debarkation）的那一刻，才从驻地拔营出发。 因此，最初守备滩头的只有四个後备步兵营与两个炮兵营。 但在一小时内，两个炮兵营与三个机步旅（mechanized infantry brigades） 作为增援抵达，随後陆战队与陆军的装甲部队也相继赶到。 这是此想定的详细状况。 在这个更为写实且对共军更严峻的结果中， 解放军海军陆战队在滩头遭到猝然封堵与逆袭（counter-attacked）， 其向海上撤离的企图遭到失败，最终导致解放军陆战队投降。 第三种模拟（超载兵力的极端想定）： 我们假定解放军同时投入三个海军陆战旅（第3、第4及第5旅）， 以检验中国能否以兵力优势压垮滩头防御 （尽管中国并没有足够的两栖运载能力， 能将相当於一个师级单位的兵力投射至距台湾海岸21 海里处）。 我们假定如此大规模的海上机动，将给予中华民国陆军充足的时间（6小时） 向海岸完成部署，并获得最远来自 40 公里外的部队增援， 使总兵力达到四个机步旅、一个陆战旅、两个装甲旅与两个炮兵旅。 由於中国将其稀缺的两栖兵力集中投入，反而让台湾能释出战略预备队， 有效反制共军的集中攻击。 解放军在第一小时试图从滩头向内陆推进未果， 随後转入防御，并在第四小时发起撤退行动且归於失败。 虽然对北京当局而言，撤退在政治上比投降更容易接受， 但这种仓促的临时性（ad hoc）撤退往往会导致伤亡直线攀升。 = 这种兵推意义在那？ 第一个兵推，解放军一个旅上来 一个後备步兵营、一个陆战队装甲营，以及一个炮兵营2小时干掉解放军一个旅？ 第二次 滩岸上有二个步兵营二个炮兵营，然後一小时内两个炮兵营 三个机步旅（mechanized infantry brigades）就利用道路从驻地跑过来 然後解放军就被打光了 第三次 解放军一次三个旅登陆 然後国军就可以传送四个机步旅、一个陆战旅、两个装甲旅与两个炮兵旅到海边 解放军就死光了 这种兵推意义是什麽？ 不考虑台湾兵力、编制、训练、装备 只要解放军登陆，国军就会无中生有和传送更多兵力到现地 然後解放军就死光了，所以永远登陆不会成功 中华民国国军可以无限造兵，无限传送，那解放军打个鸡巴 而且怎麽形容解放军空降兵？ "The PLA (Army) possesses two Air Assault Brigades and 14 Special Operations Brigades; most likely light infantry not trained for unconventional warfare. The Airborne Corps has five Airborne Brigades and a single Air Assault Brigade ." 解放军陆军拥有 2 个空中突击旅与 14 个特战旅； 这多数是未受过非正规战训练的轻步兵。 空降兵军则拥有 5 个空降旅与 1 个空中突击旅。 解放军空降兵，没有受过训练而且只有步兵 = "We make a number of assumptions. First, that both PLAN and ROCA are rated as training “competent,” and ROCA reserve BNs are “inexperienced.” We decide that the intensity of the ROCA artillery interdiction of the beaches required that the PLAN advance 4 km inland to the Force Beachhead Line before it will land the LSTs to deploy the 3rd Marine BDEs Artillery Bn: this was never achieved and the absence of this substantial source of counter-battery firepower is a key reason for the ultimate failure of the PLAN’s attack. Third, we believe that Marine-portable drones are far less effective in weight in producing damage per unit of time than the equivalent in mortar rounds, which is why we kept the mortars in lieu of drones for the PLAN." 我们做出几项假设。首先，解放军与中华民国陆军皆被评为训练「合格（competent）」 ，而陆军後备营则为「缺乏经验（inexperienced）」。我们认定，面对中华民国陆军炮 兵对海滩的阻绝射击强度，解放军海军必须向内陆推进 4 公里，抵达「部队滩头线（ Force Beachhead Line, FBL）」，才能让战车登陆舰靠岸并部署陆战第 3 旅炮兵营：这 一目标从未达成，而这股强大反炮兵火力的缺席，正是解放军海军攻击最终失败的关键原 因。 第三，我们认为单兵携带的无人机在单位时间内所产生的破坏力（按重量计算）， 远低於同等的迫击炮弹，因此我们为解放军保留了迫击炮而非替换为无人机。 因为中华民国的炮兵太强了 解放军的炮兵永远不能登陆，解放军不能用无人机只能用迫击炮 国军无限增兵，解放军不准用炮兵，不准用无人机 那台湾根本永立不败之地 这种兵推，大纪元都不敢写 -- 高志斌：大陆人吃不起茶叶蛋 黄世聪：大陆人吃泡面一定要配榨菜，但最近一段时间他们连榨菜都吃不起了 王义川：大陆高铁没靠背 于北辰：解放军登陆台湾会迷路，因为没有谷歌导航 廖美然：北京没有什麽冰箱，饭店也没冰箱，他们都不喝冷的饮料 蛙的回路果然和人类不同，总是可以一本正经地展现井底之蛙的无知 --

※ 发信站: 批踢踢实业坊(ptt.cc), 来自: 101.10.222.224 (台湾) ※ 文章网址: https://webptt.com/cn.aspx?n=bbs/Military/M.1787791799.A.8D7.html