The American Economic Review Vol. 93, No. 3, June 2003 http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/contents/june2003.html -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics 465-508 Vernon L. Smith (就是那个Smith喽,谈他的实验经济学对理性的假设) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand 509-529 Ilya Segal The standard profit-maximizing multiunit auction intersects the submitted demand curve with a preset reservation supply curve, which is determined using the distribution from which the buyers’ valuations are drawn. However, when this distribution is unknown, a preset supply curve cannot maximize monopoly profits. The optimal pricing mechanism in this situation sets a price for each buyer on the basis of the demand distribution inferred statistically from other buyers’ bids. The resulting profit converges to the optimal monopoly profit with known demand as the number of buyers goes to infinity, and convergence can be substantially faster than with sequential price experimentation. (JEL D42, D44, D82, D83) 应该是基於卖方对买方愿出价格的不完全资讯对原有模型做的修正 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Animal Spirits Through Creative Destruction 530-550 Patrick Francois and Huw Lloyd-Ellis We show how a Schumpeterian process of creative destruction can induce rational, herd behavior by entrepreneurs across diverse sectors as if fueled by “animal spirits.” Consequently, a multisector economy, in which productivity improvements are made by independent, profit-seeking entrepreneurs, exhibits regular booms, slowdowns, and downturns as part of the long-run growth process. Our cyclical equilibrium has higher average growth, but lower welfare than the corresponding acyclical one. We show how a negative relationship can emerge between volatility and growth across cycling economies, and assess the extent to which our model matches several features of actual business cycles. (JEL E0, E3, O3, O4) 建立一个模型，看看引进<创造性破坏>跟没有这种情形的经济体有何不同。结论是福利 会降低喔(trivial)另外一点是这个模型跟现实经济相符的特性... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Make Versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information 551-572 George P. Baker and Thomas N. Hubbard Explaining patterns of asset ownership is a central goal of both organizational economics and industrial organization. We develop a model of asset ownership in trucking, which we test by examining how the adoption of different classes of on-board computers (OBCs) between 1987 and 1997 influenced whether shippers use their own trucks for hauls or contract with for-hire carriers. We find that OBCs’ incentive-improving features pushed hauls toward private carriage, but their resource- allocation improving features pushed them toward for-hire carriage. We conclude that ownership patterns in trucking reflect the importance of both incomplete contracts and of job design and measurement issues. (JEL D23, L14, L22, L23, L92) 谈外包跟自行处理的效率比较，以及若外包契约应如何设计 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Wages and Employment in the United States and Germany: What Explains the Difference? 573-602 Paul Beaudry and David A. Green Over the last 20 years the wage-education relationships in the United States and Germany have evolved very differently, while the education compositions of employment have evolved in a parallel fashion. In this paper, we show how these patterns shed light on the nature of recent technological change and highlight the importance of taking into account movements in the ratio of human capital to physical capital when examining changes in the returns to skill. Our analysis indicates that the United States could have prevented the increase in wage inequality observed in the 1980’s by a faster accumulation of physical capital. (JEL J3, O3) 谈技术报酬跟人力资本比率之间的关系。 --

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